

Cyber Security for SDN

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Introduction of BATM – CELARE

SDN – How to attack ? What can we do to defend?

Celare solutions





BATM – Celare introduction of BATM – Celare





CELARE Cyber Systems is subsidiary of the BATM Advanced Communications group - London Stock Exchange (LSE:BVC)

Market focus - provides comprehensive Cyber Security solutions for Utilities, Defense, Governments, Homeland security and critical infrastructures organizations.

Cyber security solutions:

T-Metro-XG - Network security platform for Encryption and Cyber defense.

NETWIZ - Network visibility solution that provides organizations an overall understanding what is happening on the network enabling most effective management of even the most hidden network threats.

CELARE Cyber Systems is the Cyber Arm of BATM Advanced Communications group





- Leading provider of real-time technologies for:
 - Networking & Cyber market
 - Diagnostics and ECO market
- Established in 1992
- 700 engineers and scientists
- +300,000 systems deployed
- Headquarters: Israel
- International offices:
 - North America: Boston, US
 - Europe: Bulgaria; France; Germany; Hungary; Italy; Moldova; Romania; UK
 - RoW: Argentina; Australia; Russia; Singapore
- Listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE: BVC)



BATM Established 1992

- CELARE Cyber Systems Established at 2012
- BATM <u>www.batm.com</u> Advanced Communications group -London Stock Exchange (LSE:BVC)
- CELARE is subsidiary of the BATM

BATM Global Coverage











SDN – How to attack ? What can we do to defend?



Methods of Attack



Purpose of Attack



How to buy and sell hacked servers all over the world

Kaspersky Lab has uncovered xDedic, a global marketplace for compromised Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) servers, run by Russian-speakers.







SDN ARCHITECTURE - ATTACK VECTORS



❑ Most SDN architecture models have three layers:

- lower layer of SDN-capable network devices
- middle layer of SDN controller(s),
- higher layer that includes the applications and services that request or configure.
- □ We can anticipate several attack vectors on SDN systems. The more common SDN security concerns include attacks at the various SDN architecture layers.

Customer requirements – To protect all SDN Layers from Cyber attacks



SDN Security Attack Vectors









Operationalizing the Network with SDN



- □ An attacker would like :
 - □ see what flows are in use and what traffic is being permitted across the network.
 - **a** eavesdrop on **southbound communication** between the network element and the controller.
 - This information could be useful for a replay attack or simply for reconnaissance purposes.
- □ SDN systems are deployed within data:
 - Data Center Interconnect (DCI) protocols such as Network Virtualization using Generic Routing Encapsulation (NVGRE), Stateless Transport Tunneling (STT), Virtual Extensible LAN (VXLAN), Cisco Overlay Transport Virtualization (OTV), Layer 2 Multi-Path (L2MP), TRILL-based protocols (Cisco FabricPath, Juniper QFabric, Brocade VCS Fabric), Shortest Path Bridging (SPB), among others.

These protocols may lack authentication and any form of encryption to secure the packet contents. These new protocols could possess

□ Standardization are the best news for Hackers



Attacks at Controller Layer con.



- SDN controller runs on a general purpose operating system (Linux operating system) then the vulnerabilities of that OS become vulnerabilities for the controller.
 Often times the controllers are deployed into production
- using the default passwords and no security settings configured. .
- Attacker can created his own controller and got network elements to believe flows from the "rogue" controller.
 to those flows from the perspective of the production controller. In this case, the attacker would have complete control of the network







Actions for Governments

> Cyber protection is a National effort :

- What to protect from ?
- Risk assessment survey analysis of the situation
 - What are the Gaps ? Critical security gaps in current situation
 - What are the external internal threats
 - Critical asset over view situation
- Creating a master plan for 5 years
- Developing an operational concept for Cyber protection
- Technical design systems solution
- Forming special units educating and training
- Allocating resources

Cyber Security Implementation

Naval/Ground Sensors



Strong platforms and endpoints hardening • **OT-specific events collection & Traffic Analysis** • Full Network Compartmentalization ٠ Segmentation & data flow control • Interfaces monitoring & ICD enforcement • FOCS **C**⁴/ CMC VMS Platforms CCS Physical Infra. OT Network

One-way Data Diode Protection

Cyber Security Implementation

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Physical Infra.

VMS

CCS

- Network Segmentation
- Centralized Authentication, Authorization & Access (A^^` Management
- Centralized Security Policy Management
- Distributed, redundant Security Repository
- Virtualization and Storage Security Implementation
- Endpoint security & Access Control
- Platforms Security Hardening

Naval/Ground Sensors



- Endpoint Strong Authentication
- Traffic Encryption and Signing
- Network Access Control

Platforms

- Full (Success/Failure) Security Logging
- Data Flow control and monitoring

- Security events collection and analysis
- Online APT monitoring
- Real-time Anomaly Detection
- Security Analytics & Root-Cause Analysis
- Passive & Proactive threat management

Cyber Security Implementation







The OLS Model (Operational Learning System)





ADVANCED CYBER SECURITY

GROWING CYBER-ATTACK THREATS ON OIL & GAS INFRASTRUCTURE

- Comprehensive cyber security suite for NRP
- Full OT/SCADA cyber protection
- External/internal interface protection
- Integrated cyber-security and C&C
 - Cyber-security training facility





COMPREHENSIVE CYBER SECURITY SUITE



Comprehensive Cyber Training Facility







Intel Inside-Malware Inside

- **Cyber crime Photos of an NSA "upgrade" factory show Cisco router getting implant**
- Servers, routers get "beacons" implanted at secret locations by NSA's TAO team
- by <u>Sean Gallagher</u> May 14 2014, 10:30pm JDT



(TS//SI//NF) Left: Intercepted packages are opened carefully; Right: A "load station" implants a beacon









Transport Encryption

Proposed Collaboration model



- CELARE will provide T-Metro-XG platform which was originally developed for the IMOD.
- The platform supports both Network Encryption in HW and Network visibility for Cyber defense.
- Celare will provide network SW infrastructure and all support for development.
- Stage 1: VTU will develop encryption capabilities (HW based) on the T-Metro-XG
- Stage 2: Adding network visibility capabilities
- Local production capability options

Proposed Collaboration model



Czech product with full control on:

- Logistic chain
 - » Preventing logistic chain attacks
- Production
 - » No HW threats
- Proprietary and secure encryption.
 - » Secure transport for classified information
- Can work and interoperable with any commercial networks equipment
- Flexibility to use leased network infrastructure from local operators

How to Monitor Multi Campus Segmented Network













NetWiz Cyber defense Solution

The Challenges



Insider threats !

- Attacks via Global International links
- Assumption: Even heavily secured networks have vulnerabilities and probably are already infected (HUMINT, lack of procedures, targeted attack).
- Networks become huge and complex
- New threats are not detected by conventional security technologies (FW, DLP...)
- How to identify new & unknown threats (APT's)?

Solution Requirements



- Building the infrastructure for large scale network based cyber network system
- Big Data reservoir
- Full cycle threat Detection:

Collection, Recording, Analytics, Reporting, Detection

- Unknown Threats detection based on network anomalies algorithms
- Behavioral forensic tools to better understand happening in the network



Tracking Suspicious user behavior and content







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NetWiztm Performs Internal and External Monitoring and establish 24/7 incident monitoring



Monitoring the Links within the Campuses and Internet Gateways.

- Monitoring VPN connection between sites
- **Non Intrusive** network connection using smart sensors
- Creating **global view** of Network Traffic
- Protocol classification
- Metadata extraction

Sending all relevant sessions information to central monitoring

- Big Data Analysis indexing
- Rule based engine to detect
- Threats and malwares
- Network anomalies
- Network policy Abuse
- □ Correleating suspicions events (One site, Several sites)
- API to other detection systems
- Reporting to central government SIEM

NetWiz[™] Solution Overview

- Large deployment of Integrated Switch/Probes located at the network edge
- Full session reconstruction
- Metadata and content extraction

Aggregation:

- Oracle Big Data appliance distributed file system
- Recording & indexing
- Real-time and batch analytics filtering, aggregation & correlation
- Network Situational Awareness
- Investigation, Information discovery & analytics

Detection:

- User data reconstruction and analysis
- Network anomaly, Prediction
- Detectors searching threats on collected data







Over 2000 Recognized protocols and applications by signature/behavior







NETWIZ[™] Cyber Solution Overview

Conceptual Architecture



NetWiz[™] Big Data Analytics - Enables effective investigation and forensic of network incidents



NoSQL Database:

- Central DB for all Data (Input\Output)
- Scalable data capacity & throughput
- OEP Stream processor:
 - Enables easy definition of complex Network Rule set and can be activate immediately
 - Monitor streams in real-time
 - Filtering New stream filtered for specific criteria
 - Pattern Matching Notification of detected event patterns, e.g. events A, B and C occurred within 15 minute window

Graph DP & Visualization

- Advanced property graph stored on the DB
- Building the actual network dynamically



TLV Interception Visualization tool (User Behavior)



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Visualization & Information Discovery



- Solution designed to be Event driven
- Supports GEO/Maps
- Advanced graphs and filters
- Network Situational Awareness
- Facet search



Information Discovery Event Dashboard



- Solution designed to be Event driven
- Supports GEO/Maps
- Advanced graphs and filters
- Network Situational Awareness

Section Cyber LayUP *																
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▶ Event Time			1	1312019874	1/6/15 5:04	:49 PM DNS	S protocol exc	eption: invalie	d question type	e:4096			58.97.74.88	192.116.252.198		
▶ Severity			1	420833934	1/6/15 5:04	:49 PM DN	S protocol exc	eption: invali	d question type	e:4096			58.97.74.88	192.116.252.198		
Event Message			1	341233336	1/6/15 5:02	2:02 PM DN	S protocol exc	eption: invalie	d question type	e:4096			58.97.74.88	192.116.252.197		
Event Source			1	1725211093	1/6/15 5:02	2:02 PM DN	S protocol exc	eption: invali	d question type	e:4096			58.97.74.88	192.116.252.197		
▶ Rule ID			1	1627922673	1/6/15 4:56	5:12 PM DNS	S protocol exc	eption: invali	d question type	e:4096			58.97.74.88	192.116.252.193		
▶ User Name			1	438132589	1/6/15 4:56	5:12 PM DN	S protocol exc	eption: invali	d question type	e:4096			58.97.74.88	192.116.252.193		
▶ Application			1	62310433	1/6/15 4:50	:45 PM DN	S protocol exc	eption: packe	et has extra pa	yload (non dns)			192.114.187.32	80.179.52.100		
▶ MAC Address			1	352773803	1/6/15 4:50	:45 PM DN	S protocol exc	eption: packe	et has extra pa	yload (non dns)			192.114.187.32	80.179.52.100		
▶ VLAN			3	1985379601	1/6/15 4:29	33 PM Aler	t: Communica	ion with wro	ng or fake DC	- 192.114.187.12	6		85.25.43.94	192.114.187.126		
▶ Internal IP			1	1732291634	1/6/15 4:16	56 PM DN	S protocol exc	eption: invali	d question type	:4096			58.97.74.88	192.116.252.180		
▶ External IP			1	280928892	1/6/15 4:16	56 PM DN	S protocol exc	eption: invalie	d question type	:4096			58.97.74.88	192.116.252.180		
▶ TCP/UDP			1	1999241527	1/6/15 4:13	33 PM DN	S protocol exc	eption: a suc	cessfull query	response without	it answers/a	uth RRs	192.114.187.16	80.179.52.100		
Internal Port			1	769964678	1/6/15 4:13	33 PM DN	S protocol exc	eption: a suc	cessfull query	response without	t answers/a	uth RRs	192.114.187.16	80.179.52.100		
External Port			1	1834496683	1/6/15 4:02	2:14 PM DN	S protocol exc	eption: packe	et has extra pa	yload (non dns)			192.114.187.32	80.179.52.100		
			1	443909700	1/6/15 4:02	14 PM DNS	S protocol exc	eption: packe	et has extra pa	yload (non dns)			10.5.1.246	80.179.52.100		
			1	653104905	1/6/15 4:02	2:14 PM DN	S protocol exc	eption: packe	et has extra pa	yload (non dns)			192.114.187.32	80.179.52.100		
			3	1956807491	1/6/15 3:55	:47 PM Aler	t: Communicat	ion with wro	ng or fake DC	- 192.114.187.1	0		198.20.70.114	192.114.187.110		
			1	1624474083	1/6/15 3:48	3:43 PM DN	S protocol exc	eption: invali	d question type	:4096			58.97.74.88	192.116.252.183		
			1	2085667220	1/6/15 3:48	3:43 PM DN	S protocol exc	eption: invali	d question type	e:4096			58.97.74.88	192.116.252.183		
1-20 of 68 20 per pag																
Sessions																
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	ation Discovery LayUP Dashboard	Cyber LayUP ≉						
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Selected Filters No refinements have been selected.	Current Day Image: No data to display. Please broaden your selections. Sort: Start Period Hour							
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Information Discovery Events Dashboard



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Graph DB Visualization



Internal Network Visualization



Solution Benefits



- Monitoring multiple links with speeds up to 40Gbps
- Agnostic to physical link (SDH, PTN, Ethernet) and Transport protocol (IP, MPLS)
- Distributed & Low cost
- Open architecture and scalable
- Low cost Switch/probes enable flexible deployment over the network
- Integrated with Any Big Data & tools
- Based on standard analytics tools and products (e.g. Oracle Endeca, OEP, Open Source)
- Open API for external systems and 3rd party applications and Algorithms



Thank You